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3As part of a broader current of critique of the economic and political
dynamics of prison privatisation — a critique that initially emanated from
the USA — this paper focuses on Scotland and on research carried out at
its then only private penal institution, HMP Kilmarnock. The authors dis-
mantle the government’s case for extending prison privatisation by drilling
deep into the experience of Kilmarnock and demonstrating the deleterious
effects of marketisation for prison officers and prisoners alike. Degraded pay
and conditions and systemic understaffing corroded morale, exposed staff
and inmates to risk, and contributed to massive officer turnover. Compelling
evidence comes from sources ordinarily unavailable to critical researchers,
such as internal company and government documentation. 
Aprimary aim of the neoliberal project, of whichprivatisation is a signal feature, has been to open up newfields for capital accumulation in areas previously
considered immune from the ‘calculus of profitability’ (Harvey,
: ; Kerr, ). Indeed, it is argued that privatisation should be
seen as part of an effort by the state to disengage from investment
while stimulating capital accumulation (Kerr, ), giving the
private sector lucrative investment opportunities while providing
the legal, social and economic structures to enable employers to
drive down wage levels and increase worker efficiency. All kinds of
public utility, transportation, social welfare provision and public
institutions have been privatised to varying degrees throughout the
capitalist world; but prison privatisation provides an excellent
example of the marketisation of a core state activity that seemed
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fanciful only a short time ago. In the UK, an outlandish proposal
made by a marginal far-right think tank (Adam Smith Institute,
) became mainstream government policy, and generated a
multi-million-pound market (Cavadino & Dignan, ). 
The privatisation discourse of successive UK governments has
always stressed the importance of market disciplines in breaking up
‘unnatural’ monopolies, subjecting them to efficiency-generating
competition, restoring managerial prerogative, and improving
service quality. Yet it is not universally acknowledged that labour
and the labour process have been central concerns of those driving
privatisation. Apart from the desire to reduce absolute numbers in
what were stigmatised as the bloated public-sector workforces, the
aim is to use labour more flexibly, hence intensively, through
process re-engineering in order to raise productivity (Ellis & Taylor,
; Glyn, ). The achievement of these objectives is related to
the euphemistically termed ‘reform’ of employment relations,
which is essentially the recasting of workers’ terms and conditions
through a sustained assault on trade unions. The abrupt and radical
nature of the Conservatives’ privatisation of nationalised industries
during the 980s stimulated a body of critical literature exploring
the consequences for employment relations (e.g. Colling & Ferner,
; Ferner & Colling, ; O’Connell Davidson, ; Pendleton,
; Pendleton & Winterton, ). While the impact was uneven1
and sectorally contingent (Arrowsmith, ), common outcomes
were observed: widespread redundancies, decentralised bargaining,
new management styles (‘macho’ or ‘partnership’), diminished
union influence, lean staffing and work intensification.
Of course, the application of market mechanisms was not
restricted to nationalised industries. Compulsory competitive
tendering (CCT) was followed in the early 990s by the private
finance initiative (PFI), which significantly expanded the private
sector’s role in providing services in local government, the civil
service, the NHS and elsewhere (Corby & White, ).
Notwithstanding rhetorical claims to the contrary, New Labour
extended privatisation and broadened the rationale of PFI to
encompass public–private partnerships (PPPs), in which public-
sector organisations commission and pay for services, but do not
directly provide them (Treasury, ). The modernisation agenda
was centred on ‘best value’ (BV), which put ‘users of services
centre stage’ while maintaining a ‘strong emphasis on competition’.
Ostensibly intended to remove the narrow prescription and cost
minimisation that tarnished CCT (Blair, ), BV actually led to
tighter performance management directed at raising service
standards and leveraging efficiencies (Richardson et al., ). The
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5interests of ‘producers’ were further subordinated to ‘consumers’
as Blair () insisted on ‘more flexible staff working practices’
and a ‘break away from outdated systems’ of industrial relations. 
In contrast to the first privatisations, much less attention has
been paid to the impact on employees from PFI and, particularly,
from Labour’s PPP initiatives. Despite the large numbers involved,
the emergence of a public-services (as opposed to public-sector)
workforce, and the centrality of new performance management,
which pose enormous challenges for labour, the paucity of
evidence-based research is striking (Morgan & Allington, ). To
an extent, this is mirrored in academia where, for example, journals
in the broad fields of employment relations2 contain only a handful
of articles on the effects of PFI/PPP on workers. Exceptions
include Hebson et al.’s () study of contractual approaches to
managing and the emphasis placed upon the meeting of
performance targets. Worker interviews revealed cost-cutting, work
intensification and understaffing. An NHS Trust porter bemoaned
the halving of his section’s staff following PFI. His cri de coeur,
‘They are running us ragged’ (ibid: ), may well capture the
largely unreported condition of many among the post-privatised
workforces. Additional literature has generated insights, including
Toynbee’s () account of the quotidian experiences of
contracted-out hospital porters, care-home workers and school
cooks. Often, we rely on trade union sources (Unison, ; ) or
critical think tanks (Sachdev, ) to provide an understanding of
consequences of PFI/PPP at workplace level. More specifically, in
respect of this paper’s focus, despite the controversial nature of
prison privatisation, academic studies (Black, ; Corby, )
have yet to engage with the workplace consequences of
contracting-out under PFI/PPP within the UK penal system. 
This paper contributes to the remedying of some of these
deficiencies by providing detailed evidence of workforce
management, working conditions and employment relations at
Scotland’s only private prison. HMP Kilmarnock opened in March
, operated by Premier Prison Services (PPS or ‘Premier’),
which is itself jointly owned by the multinationals Serco and
Wackenhut. The context for the case study was the Scottish
Executive’s proposal to extend privatisation by building three new,
-prisoner establishments under PFI. Three complementary
reports advocating privatisation were published simultaneously: the
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Scottish Prison Estates Review by the Scottish Prison Service (SPS,
), the Financial Review of Scottish Prison Service Estates Review by
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC, ), and a Consultation Document
by the Scottish Executive (). Had their proposals been
implemented, 36 per cent of Scotland’s prisoner population would
have been incarcerated in private jails, compared to  per cent in
the UK and 7 per cent in the USA (Hallett, : ), the latter being
the country with the longest history of prison privatisation.
Widespread opposition from politicians, unions, prison reformers
and from across civil society forced the Executive to institute an
inquiry into its proposals through the Scottish parliament’s Justice
1 Committee. 
In the course of this paper, we draw on evidence in the public
domain that contributed to or emerged from the public debate. We
outline the Scottish Executive’s main arguments in relation to
labour utilisation and cost, and PPS management’s defence of its
management of Kilmarnock. Since working conditions were
portrayed as essentially non-problematic by government, the
Scottish Prison Service and PWC, they formed part of the
justification for the extended programme of prison privatisation.
Against this, we present data critical of Kilmarnock’s performance
and specifically of its labour management, drawn from official
sources including Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons (HMIP,
; ; HMCIP, )3 and submissions to the Justice 1
Committee (Scottish Parliament, ), all of which were wilfully
disregarded by those driving privatisation. Notwithstanding the
significance of this evidence, the paper’s real empirical bite comes
from data sources that expose the hidden realities of a UK private
prison and, more generally, cast light on what are the typically
opaque processes surrounding privatisation. The first source is of a
kind that critical researchers are rarely able to access: internal
company documentation including more than fifty briefings, reports
and reviews for consideration by management at establishment and
corporate levels. These are supplemented by email and other
written correspondence between management and with the Prison
Service and the Prison Service Union (PSU). This data covers the
period May  to February . The second source consists of
five contemporaneous, in-depth interviews with prison officers
currently or recently employed at Kilmarnock. 
This paper’s import stretches beyond the particular cases of
HMP Kilmarnock, Scotland’s polity or the prison sector. New
Labour has hailed prison privatisation as a success not only in penal
policy terms, but also because it provides a paradigm for the public
sector generally (Sachdev, : ). Former Prime Minister Blair
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7declared that the private sector has triggered ‘major improvements
in the way that public prisons are operated with considerable
efficiency gains’ (: ), and the (then) Chancellor of the
Exchequer Gordon Brown, making a specific reference to prisons,
claimed that ‘the use of private contractors is not at the expense of
the public interest or need be at the expense of terms and
conditions of employees’ (Brown, ). Consequently, the primary
evidence presented below, which demonstrates that a private
contractor did degrade the conditions of staff to such an extent
that the public interest was undoubtedly compromised, implies a
broader critique of the privatisation project. 
Traversing the empirical and the theoretical, this paper raises
questions about the relationship between capital and the state in the
privatisation process. It is incontestable that privatisation benefits a
coalition of corporate executives, politicians, investment bankers
and accounting firms, which profit from the process through which
public assets (or services hitherto provided by the state) are floated
on the market, with the aim of maximising shareholder value
(Callinicos, : ). Monbiot () has provided telling case
studies that demonstrate this. However, notwithstanding the
increasing porosity of state and capital in the neoliberal era
(Harvey, : ), it does not follow that their interests should
necessarily coincide exactly at all times and in every detail. The
state is no mere cipher, no passive captive of corporate interests but
rather, as many observe, is the initiator and driver of the wider
capitalist project of neoliberalism, deregulation and globalisation.
Within the reciprocal undertaking of privatisation, it has its own
sets of interest. For example, in driving privatisation, UK (and
Scottish) government agendas have been profoundly shaped if not
determined by political–economic pressures such as the need to
comply with the monetary convergence criteria of the Maastricht
Treaty and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
(see Krajewski, ; Leys, ). 
Unsurprisingly, private-sector involvement in the provision of
prison facilities has progressed most in ‘neoliberal’ countries
(Cavadino & Dignan, ). Critical literature has analysed the
dynamics of the global corrections industry and ‘prison industrial
complex’ (Wood, ) that originated in the USA. By ,
correctional firms operated two dozen major facilities, and
expansion thereafter was rapid (Sinden, ). Hallett (: )
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estimates that between  and , the number of inmates in US
for-profit prisons increased nearly by  per cent. Private
incarceration became big business, with the two largest companies,
the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and Wackenhut
Corrections, performing ‘handsomely’ (Parenti, : ). However,
it is an analytical mistake to regard the spectacular growth in the
prison population4 as a unilinear outcome of the state’s capture by
private capital and corporations’ aggressive drive for profits. While
the prison industry undoubtedly shaped criminal-justice policy at
state and federal levels through inter alia extensive lobbying,
interlocking interests and shared personnel, it is important to
acknowledge the longer-term and profound transformations in
criminology and criminal justice. 
Radical analysts insist that imprisonment has been a response of
the US state to the contradictions of restructured US capitalism
and a prolonged societal crisis, encapsulated in the phrase, a ‘war on
crime’. From the s on, penal policies shifted from focusing on
indeterminate ‘rehabilitative’ practices to the imposition of
lengthy mandatory minimum sentences (Hallett, : ).
Political agendas were increasingly dominated by the rhetoric of
crime control, and priorities centred on the ‘war on drugs’, or ‘zero
tolerance’ (McElligot, ). There was a distinctive racial dynamic
to this, given the disproportionately large numbers of African-
Americans and Latinos in private institutions: ‘an ever rising sea of
black people monitored by predominantly white overseers’
(Hallett, : ). ‘Lockdown’ penal policies created overcrowded
and more costly prisons, which increasingly resembled
‘warehouses’. In conditions of supply and demand, the correctional
industry exploited the growing market opportunities. In sum, the
explosion of the prison population has been both cause and
consequence of the ‘prison industrial complex’, ‘a convergence of
the economic and political interests of exalting corporate profits
and elite power from incarceration’ (Chang & Thompkins, :).
Prison privatisation exemplifies the symbiotic relationship between
state and capital, with government attracted to privatisation by
cost-cutting, and corporate interests driven by the logic of profit
maximisation and capital accumulation. 
US critics argue that private firms ultimately privilege profit over
the interests of the public, the prisoners and their rehabilitation. In
order to expand markets, correctional companies might deny
inmates due process, lengthen their sentences, and lobby for laws
and policies that create more imprisonment (Schneider, ).
Certainly, cost-cutting has often led to the kind of conditions
Parenti (: ‒) described as a ‘private hell’ for prisoners. The
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9denial of rights, prison guard brutality, lack of facilities (e.g.
medical care) and inmate violence are well documented (Greene,
; Alexander, ), with Wackenhut achieving perhaps the
greatest notoriety (Palast, ).5 Since salaries account for around
 per cent of prison budgets (Bureau of Justice Statistics, ),
eroding pay and conditions and the marginalisation (or exclusion) of
unions have been the principal objectives of the privatisers. The
results have invariably been lower-quality and inexperienced staff,
less training and a higher rate of attrition6 (Miller, ). Yet, despite
the assault on pay and conditions and the promise of cost reduction,
US studies suggest that real cost differences between state and
private prisons are insignificant. The General Accounting Office of
the Federal Government (⁾ found only marginal cost
discrepancy, and the Department of Justice concluded that ‘rather
than the projected % … the average saving from privatization was
only about %’ (Sinden, : ). 
UK developments have largely mirrored those in the USA. First
advocated by the Adam Smith Institute (ASI, ), privatisation, it
was argued, ‘would overcome both the spiralling costs of the prison
system and the shortage of places by using innovative managerial
and technological methods and by concentrating resources’ (cited in
Nathan, : ). Although privatisation was initially rejected by
government, a  Home Affairs Committee report invited firms to
‘tender for the construction and management of custodial
institutions’. A more ideologically partisan and influential ASI
briefing (Young, ) then pressed for privatisation in order to break
‘monopolistic provision’ and to weaken trade unions. As in the USA,
where political and economic interests converged to shape penal
policy and to pursue corporate gain, there emerged a ‘powerful
combination of personal self-interest and corporate self-
aggrandizement’ (Cavadino & Dignan, : ). US companies
profoundly influenced UK government policy (Nathan, ). For
example, CCA formed UK Detention Services Ltd (UKDS) as a
joint venture with construction companies McAlpine and Mowlem,
both major contributors to the Conservative Party. UKDS admitted
that ‘it took us two or three years to finally convince government
that this [privatisation] was indeed the right course of action’
(Nathan, : ). Crucially, the Criminal Justice Act ()
extended privatisation to remand centres (firstly to Wold), and in
, Home Secretary Baker announced the building of a new
private jail (Blakenhurst) for remand and sentenced prisoners.
Thereafter, privatisation was pursued through the ‘DCMF’ —
privately designed, constructed, managed and financed — model.
Underlining governments’ need to reduce union influence was the
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Prison Officers Association’s (POA) success in slowing Howard’s
extensive privatisation programme following complaints to the CAC
over lack of consultation. The contracting-out of existing prisons
was also stalled by the European Commission’s Acquired Rights
Directive, which secures employees’ terms and conditions following
transfer from the public sector. Despite these setbacks, widespread
privatisation proceeded under PFI. 
New Labour abandoned the unequivocal commitment it had
held while in opposition to reverse the Conservatives’ programme,
and to return privatised prisons to the public sector ‘as soon as
contractually possible’ (PPRI, May ). Within a week of
becoming home secretary, Jack Straw signed the outstanding
contracts, and within a month approved three further private
establishments. Labour’s volte-face was complete when Straw
announced that all new prisons in England and Wales would be
privately built and run (Cavadino & Dignan, ). By , eight
private jails including Kilmarnock had been built or had opened
under Labour (NAO, , ‒). Consequently, the UK has the most
privatised criminal-justice system in Europe, with its own ‘prison
industrial complex’ (Nathan, ). Contracts are distributed
between a handful of global companies; Premier, UKDS (now
Kalyx), Group 4, Securicor and GSL Limited (PPRI, , no. ).
This is not unregulated free competition, since the size of the
custodial ‘market’, the nature and terms of services supplied, and
even the identities of these ‘players’ are determined by the state.  
Despite operational problems in England and Wales (Nathan,
; PPRI, ‒), government reports provide largely sanitised
accounts. Privatisation is justified as the only cost-efficient ‘solution’
to a prison population that has grown by  per cent since the first
PFI contract: ‘The use of the PFI to build new prisons has helped the
Prison Service cope with this increase speedily and cost efficiently
and has created the necessary conditions for competition in the
management of existing public prisons’ (NAO, : ). 
Official reports do fleetingly reveal differences between the
private and public sectors in respect of, in the former, lower pay,
longer hours, less holidays, inferior overtime entitlement, poorer
pensions and smaller staff–prisoner ratios (Table 1; and see also
NAO, ). According to recent Pay Review Board data, private-
sector officers earn  per cent less than those in the state sector
(PPRI, , no.). This leaner, cost-efficient and more flexible
private model is held up as a virtuous comparator in order to
discipline the public-sector workforce and to put pressure on the
POA, since it is identified by the state as a major obstacle to
privatisation. Industrial relations ‘reform’ has been central to
10
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‘modernisation’. Successive governments have striven to combat
powerful union organisation, with its 90-per-cent-plus density, and
to overcome the legacy of troublesome industrial relations by inter
alia curbing the right of unions to take industrial action (Corby,
2002) and creating a POA-free7 segment in which flexibilities could
be freely implemented. In no private prison opened since  has
the POA been granted recognition (Bach, ). Certain private
operators (notably Premier) do recognise the Prison Service Union,
which formed in  as ‘a disaffected splinter group’ from the POA
(Black, ). The PSU defines itself as a moderate body that
accepts privatisation, eschews the POA’s political campaigning role,
and seeks constructive partnerships with private operators. Thus, a
dichotomous industrial relations structure is both a reflection of
and contributes to the two-tier public/private prison workforce. 
HMP Kilmarnock operates under a twenty-five-year contract
between the Scottish Prison Service (SPS) and Premier Prison
Services (PPS), a subsidiary of the Premier Custodial Group
(PCG). The contract is monitored daily by two SPS staff
members, the senior acting as controller, and if performance
targets are not met, the SPS can impose financial penalties on
PPS. There are twenty-eight targets or ‘key performance
indicators’, although significantly, none measures staff welfare or
working conditions for compliance with the Working Time
Inside the private prison
Table 1: Pay and conditions for prison ofﬁcers (public sector) and prison custody 
ofﬁcers (private sector) compared (2001–2) 
Average basic pay
Pay range
Average weekly
contracted hours
Overtime pay
Pension
Prison officer
£18,550
£16,159-£23,110
39
TOIL, or up to 9 hours a week
for 13 weeks at £11 per hour
Final salary scheme —
employer contribution rate
equivalent to 18.5 per cent
Prison custody officer
£14,500
£11,500-£17,500
40-42
None, flat rate or 1.5 x
Money purchase scheme.
Employer contribution from 
2-5 per cent
(Source: MCG, 2001)
HMP Kilmarnock and the case for privatisation in Scotland 
Directive, the provision of rest breaks, or staff satisfaction
generally. Tasks performed by prison governors in the state sector
are entrusted at Kilmarnock to a director employed by PPS,
although the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act ()
precludes directors from carrying out certain responsibilities
such as prisoner adjudications, investigating complaints against
staff and reporting to the SPS, which remain the responsibility of
the controller. In common with PFI/PPP projects, the
government insists that a private contractor’s contractual
compliance is sufficient to guarantee effective performance and
the maintenance of the public interest. 
The government’s case for extending privatisation rested almost
entirely on claimed financial savings of £m based on a putative
comparison between the supposedly sclerotic public sector and
Kilmarnock, cast as a successful example of private provision.
Elsewhere, we have critiqued the validity of these calculations,
provided for the Scottish Executive by accountants PWC,
elsewhere (Cooper & Taylor, ). However, reprising the Adam
Smith Institute’s aspiration from decades earlier, PWC identified
the fundamental source of the private sector’s cost savings as lying
in the ‘significantly reduced staff levels compared with the public
sector achieved mainly by the adoption of different and more
flexible working practices’ (: ).
Although neither PWC nor the Scottish Executive detailed
these flexible practices, they did stipulate that staffing levels were
‘around 25% lower than [in] the public sector’. Savings also derived
from radical adjustments to pay, made possible because the private
sector ‘operates local recruitment and pay regional market rates for
all grades of staff ’ — a strategy that delivered ‘competitive pay
rates for prisoner custody officers’ (Scottish Executive, : ). In
defending Kilmarnock’s labour management before Justice 1,
Elaine Bailey, PCG’s managing director, provided additional
justification based on neoclassical economic assumptions, claiming
that in a competitive labour market, unlike in the public sector,
Premier responds swiftly and successfully to market signals: 
The proper comparison is not with the public sector, because
we do not aim to match public sector terms and conditions.
We aim to attract sufficient high-quality staff from the local
Kilmarnock area, so we have to make our package attractive
in the first place … If we cannot attract the staff then we
have to enhance the package. I would say that what we are
offering is competitive in the market from which we are try-
ing to attract staff. (Justice 1 Committee [] col. )
12
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The Executive was signposting its intention to extend local pay
determination to the proposed new prisons, which implied threats
to the integrity of the prison service, to national pay bargaining
and to the role of the POA (Scotland). Nowhere in the three
documents advocating privatisation did the Executive, SPS or
PWC suggest that reduced staffing, lesser terms and conditions for
staff or labour flexibilities might be problematic. ‘Contrary to
views by opponents of privately managed prisons that staffing
levels are unacceptable, the SPS fully evaluated and accepted the
robustness of the operator’s staffing proposals and experience to
date has reinforced SPS judgement that the levels of deployment
work well’ (Scottish Executive, a: ‒).
In order for privatisation to be expanded, the record of
Kilmarnock had to be defended. At Justice 1, PCG and the SPS
combined to rebut specific allegations. Responding to charges that
high attrition was undermining performance, Kilmarnock’s director
(Tasker) claimed that turnover had dropped to  per cent, an
‘indication that we are getting things basically right’ (Justice 1
Committee [], col. ) and that staff levels were now
currently ‘up to strength’ (col. ). Tasker also rebutted
allegations that officers were compelled to work 3-4 hour shifts
with only 0-5 minute breaks as untrue, while the SPS director,
Tony Cameron, denied that inadequate staffing was compromising
the safety of employees and inmates, and rejected accusations that
incidents that incurred penalty points and fines for PPS were being
underreported (cols. ‒). Cameron even disputed that safety
was inextricably linked to staffing levels, arguing that they were not
a concern for the SPS so long as PPS fulfilled its contractual
obligations (col. ). 
In sum, government — in the form of the Scottish Executive and
its agency, the SPS — and capital (Premier) formed a triumvirate of
vested interest, articulating their common objective in radically
enlarging privatisation and defending the operation of Scotland’s
existing private jail. Kilmarnock exemplified the efficient labour
utilisation that served as a cost-efficient model for the public sector,
and to the extent that working conditions were considered, they
were portrayed as being essentially non-problematic. 
In accepting without question Premier’s account of working
conditions, the Scottish Executive and SPS wilfully disregarded
critical evidence from the Prison Inspectorate (HMIP). Although
Inside the private prison
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the first HMIP report () was relatively circumspect, it did refer
to difficulties caused by ‘staffing levels’, notably the absence of a
strategic approach to drugs misuse (paras. ., .) and fears for
staff safety (para. .). The later Intermediate Report (HMIP,
200) was more emphatic. The Inspectorate concluded that
Premier’s strict adherence to the detail of the contract and its fear
of incurring financial penalties were responsible for several
problems. For instance, management had refused to commit
additional resources to priority areas (paras. .‒.) such as
healthcare, social work and rehabilitation. Prisoners were
disincentivised from participating in programmes designed to
challenge their offending behaviour because of the importance
Premier attached to revenue-generating activities in prison
industries. Inmates were permitted only two ‘unauthorised
absences’ from work, a definition that included attendance at
classes aimed at addressing offending behaviour (para. .).
Underpinning this contractual inflexibility was understaffing.
Simply put, there were insufficient officers to transfer prisoners
between the workshops and educational classes. More obviously,
low staffing 
in the houseblocks continued to be a concern. It was often
the case that single officers were supervising large numbers
of prisoners, due to the competing pressures of demands for
escorts and other out-of-wing activities. ‘A’ wing, in particu-
lar, which houses LTPs (Long-Term Prisoners), seemed to
be a particularly difficult place to work. With the current
staffing levels, it did not, in our opinion, feel a particularly
safe environment for either prisoners or staff. (para. .)
The Inspectorate also discovered labour retention difficulties.
Attrition, at  per cent, was ‘significantly higher than any other
Scottish prison’ (e.g. Barlinnie,  per cent; Greenock,  per cent;
Edinburgh,  per cent) (para. .). Exit interviews suggested that
rather than the attractions of rival employers being the cause of
the turnover, it was dissatisfaction with working conditions.
Operational problems were further demonstrated by Scotland-
wide statistics showing that Kilmarnock outstripped all public
establishments in inter alia unauthorised absences, possession of
unauthorised articles, arson and property damage (SPRC, ).
Testimony to Justice 1 underscored the Inspectorate’s criticisms,
including telling evidence given by Phil Hornsby, PSU secretary,
whom the Committee reported as having attributed difficulties to:
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the ferocity of the tendering system [which] means that
every new private prison that comes on stream does so with
fewer staff on lower pay, because the wage bill is the big cost
in running a prison. He claimed that an average [increase] of
around % would be required at HMP Kilmarnock to bring
the level up to proper staffing complement. (Scottish
Parliament, : )
The irony is that Hornsby is gesturing here towards a critique of
the privatisation process upon which his union depends for its
existence. The lean staffing and inferior conditions he now opposes
are central to achieving the cost reduction that makes the private
operators attractive to the state, and which is simultaneously the
source of their profits. 
Yet the state has its own interests, which may partially or
temporarily conflict with those of firms. Specific motivations
(public spending reduction, penal policies, the Maastricht Treaty,
etc.) may lead it to pursue cost reduction with such vigour that it
provokes complaints from contractors that the margins being
offered in contracts are too tight. 
Given their reluctance to compromise profits, the only possible
outcomes are further staffing cuts and the imposition of additional
labour ‘flexibilities’. This is the basis of Hornsby’s objections. If
workers are squeezed too far, operational effectiveness may be
undermined, which, in turn, may lead to breaches of key
performance indicator targets and financial penalties for
contractors. 
Arguably, this evidence from official sources, notably the
Inspectorate reports, was sufficiently critical to have halted
Scotland’s privatisation programme. In fact, it seriously understated
the depth of Kilmarnock’s problems, revealed only by data which
is ordinarily publicly inaccessible.  
Management documentation demonstrates that to describe
Kilmarnock as a regime in crisis is not to indulge in hyperbole. To
cite but one example, in an email to Premier’s finance director,
Kilmarnock’s director warned that a ‘number of factors coming
together could lead to a failure of control or major incidents,
industrial action by staff or a further worsening of contact
performance’ (Nick Cameron to Nigel Beswick,  October ).
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A prison in crisis: Evidence from management sources 
Understafﬁng 
The principal ‘factor’ was understaffing, as evidenced by the
volume of emails, memos and reports highlighting shortfalls
against what were termed ‘ASLs’ (actual staffing levels), namely the
ideal levels of staffing as defined by the contract. A June 2002
briefing by the assistant director of finance, Ken Paul, conceded
that the prison had been operating at ‘an average of eight PCO
[prison custody officer] vacancies per month’ over the previous 
months, and that it currently had ‘a vacancy level of ’. Weeks
later, he admitted that operating below ASL meant that ‘inevitably
some things get missed and we are constantly fire-fighting’ (email
from Ken Paul to Cameron,  July ). Excessive sickness
absences exacerbated staff shortages so that Kilmarnock was
operating at only  per cent of ASL (email from Cameron to
Premier’s finance director Nigel Beswick,  November ). In a
remarkable sequence of events, profound problems in another PPS
establishment had compounded the problem of inadequate
staffing. On  May , the director general of the Prison Service
(England and Wales) declared Ashfield Young Offenders
Institution to be ‘unsafe for both staff and young people’ (PPRI, no.
) and assumed direct control. Attempting to save its contract,
Premier then seconded PCOs from Kilmarnock to Ashfield to
boost staffing levels: ‘The need to supply detached duty staff over
the summer period will be a high burden on all contracts but one
that must be suffered in order to keep Ashfield in Premier’ (email
from PCG managing director Elaine Bailey,  June ).
The negative consequences for Kilmarnock forced its director to
request that staff be retained. There was ‘concern about our
commitment to Ashfield affecting performance of HMP
Kilmarnock. On the back of the contract performance in the first
quarter of this year, I believe that it is imperative that we balance
both the need to support Ashfield and the need to successfully
deliver to contract’ (letter to PCG operations manager,  July ).
Thus, a crisis in one Premier institution, Ashfield, caused in
large part by cost cutting and understaffing, aggravated emerging
problems of a similar nature in another, Kilmarnock. Despite the
severity of this situation, neither Premier nor SPS made any
reference to it during their testimony to the Justice 1 Committee.
Attrition: Extent, causes, consequences
Actual levels of attrition far exceeded the figures supplied by
Premier to Justice 1. Average PCO turnover for  was calculated
at  per cent by consultants MCG (: ) and at  per cent by
16
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Kilmarnock’s HR department, compared to the  per cent figure
given to the parliamentary inquiry. Therefore, since turnover
remained consistent with the 32 per cent discovered by the
Inspectorate for , Kilmarnock was evidently not ‘getting things
basically right’, as Premier claimed it was. That management
fabricated figures for public consumption was admitted by the
prison director in an email to his company director:
I have completed a draft response to Justice 2 with the info
they requested. However, I am concerned that I do not provide
them with info they can beat us with, or info that we have
declined to give them in the past for confidential reasons …
Staff Turnover. Do we give them since opening? Will they cor-
respond with previous info given? We don’t want them saying
we have changed the figs. I’ve looked through previous tran-
scripts, but we can’t find the % which would clash with the
figures for  of 6% that I would send them? Did we ever
give them the fig of %? In Oct  at Justice 1 Ron gave an
estimated fig of .%, so 6% would be good news. (Cameron
to Bailey,  June )
MCG challenges Premier’s assertion that market-driven pay was
sufficient to attract and retain staff. Given that the district was
‘characterised by the highest unemployment in Scotland … and a
steady flow of redundancies’, recruitment and retention should not
have been difficult. Yet 
both are causing problems at Kilmarnock where PCO volun-
tary resignations in the last 6 months have risen to % …
PCO and DCO pay and hours compare unfavourably with
the pay of public and private sector staff engaged in work
requiring some similar interpersonal skills, including police,
prison, social and community work … Operational Support
staff receive less pay than many security guards and about
the same as supermarket shelf-fillers and checkout operators,
though less than some … pay rates need to be increased well
above inflation in order to attract the quality of recruits
needed. The benefits package currently remains below mar-
ket levels but action [is needed] to improve hours, pensions
and holidays to minimum acceptable levels. (MCG, : ,)
Questionnaire results (Table 2) from an earlier internal study
show the depth of employee dissatisfaction that made exit an
inevitable outcome. 
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Kilmarnock’s workforce lacked experience and quality. An HR
report (October ) admitted that  per cent of PCOs had less
than two years’ service, and over  per cent had finished training
within the last four months. Many staff ‘lack[ed] the ability to be
good PCOs, but we accept them as little alternative exists’ (email
from Cameron to Beswick,  November ). This ‘experiential
gap’ extended to supervisory grades. An assistant director
complained to the director that twelve out of seventeen
supervisors had less than three-and-a-half years’ prison
experience, and that staffing shortages meant that Premier had
been ‘virtually unable to provide them any training to equip them
for this role’ (email from Ken Paul,  July ). 
Senior management figures repeatedly described the way staff
shortages were causing operational difficulties, such as the failure
to conduct visitor searches in contravention of SPS rules. Again,
these private admissions of acute problems contradicted Premier’s
(and SPS’s) public representation of Kilmarnock. In the prison’s
detox and drug abuse clinic, staff could not cope with the volume
of cases. The problem was so serious that ‘the mentally ill are being
neglected as are the genuinely ill’ (email from assistant director, 
February ). The clinical manager briefed senior management (
May ) on the ‘chronic shortage of staff ’ illustrated by
vacancies for five out of twelve qualified nursing posts. Staff were
at ‘breaking point’ because of poor pay and stress caused by
working as many as seventy hours most weeks. The manager was
convinced that it was only a ‘matter of time’ before ‘a critical
mistake’ occurred. The assistant director for Industries complained
about similar conditions in the workshops:
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Table 2: Employee satisfaction survey
Unsure
1
3
1
2
1
4
16
(Source: Closing the Door on Turnover, 2001)
No
98
117
121
122
122
40
74
Yes
29
8
6
4
5
84
38
Is there a team/community spirit within the organisation?
Does the company listen to employees?
Do you trust the organisation to look after your interests?
Do you have conﬁdence in the organisation to respond 
to employee concerns?
Does the organisation display commitment/loyalty to employees?
Are you currently seeking alternative employment?
Do you think you will be working for the organisation in 5 years?
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Industries’ staff are constantly highlighting the issue of low
staffing levels … It is my opinion that staff within Industries
are working under unnecessary levels of stress … I feel that
I have been pressured into reducing staffing levels in the
interests of meeting unrealistic budget targets despite having
expressed concerns on these matters many times. (Lawrence
McGhee, email to director,  March )
Management’s responses 
The key to understanding the way management responded to these
risks lies in appreciating the private operator’s obsession with
maintaining profitability and minimising key performance indicator
penalty points. In late , Premier’s finance director admonished
the prison director because the contract was losing ‘£k, £m
down on budget and £k down on forecast’ (email from Beswick to
Cameron,  November ). Cameron immediately replied stating
that key performance indicators, because of their potential to incur
financial penalties, were the most significant issue. What intensified
concerns over fines and profits was the decision by SPS to increase
prison numbers from 8 to  by early . As Cameron wrote in
an email to Beswick, ‘The staff at present are struggling to manage
… A rise to nearly  has the potential to tip things over the edge
… As director I must advise against adding another  prisoners to
an already fragile situation’ ( November ).
Having identified staff shortages and high turnover as the main
causes of the current crisis and of future risk, management sought
to make marginal improvements to ‘T&Cs’ (terms and conditions).
They proposed that pay be raised beyond the ‘contract uplift of 3-
4%’ and that recruitment be accelerated. Although extremely
modest, these adjustments nevertheless required authorisation by the
corporate executive. There followed intense lobbying of PCG by
Kilmarnock’s management. It is an extraordinary episode that
highlights the tightness of financial controls exercised by parent
companies over their subsidiaries in order to protect profits. A
covering letter from PCG to Serco and Wackenhut (Bailey, 
December ) indicates the trivial sum (£,) that was needed
to fund the improved pay award, although even this expenditure
required shareholder approval. Concurrent with these concentrated
efforts to prise resources from Premier, Kilmarnock pressurised the
SPS to raise the baseline of key performance indicators in order to
reduce the risk of financial penalties. In sum, management was
motivated to address staff ‘T&Cs’ only when it faced the prospect of
contractual penalties that would damage profitability. 
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Prison Service Union 
Documents offer insight into the relationship between the PSU and
PPS. Despite the union’s commitment to privatisation and its eager
‘embrace of the partnership concept with Premier’ (Hornsby to
Serco,  November ), dissatisfaction with staffing levels, pay,
hours and conditions was so profound that the PSU assumed an
oppositional posture: ‘My own Executive Council and, more
importantly, my own membership are now calling for me to adopt
a much more vigorous and robust stance on perceived employment
abuses in the private sector custodial service … Premier is in
danger of becoming the worst employer in the private sector’
(ibid.). As observed, Hornsby later criticised Premier at Justice 1,
memorably reporting that  per cent of PSU members at
Kilmarnock received income support (col. ,  April ). Yet
the PSU’s resistance never amounted to a thoroughgoing critique of
privatisation. Rather, Hornsby used employee discontent to
pressurise Premier into making the most limited improvements.
For added leverage, he raised the spectre of the POA: ‘There is now
no doubt that the POA are preparing the ground for a bid for
recognition by Premier in June  …The Company must start to
behave like a responsible employer if disaster is to be avoided. I
believe that the time is rapidly approaching when Premier will be
required to defend the high staff turnover publicly’ (ibid.). 
Throughout, the PSU played the role of loyal opposition, as
evidenced by its silence over Premier’s fictitious turnover figures. It
was only when the union began to lose legitimacy in its members’
eyes that it voiced concerns. Significantly, during the staffing crisis of
autumn , the PSU supported Kilmarnock and the PPS in their
overtures to the parent companies for more resources. There were
self-imposed constraints on the PSU’s capacity and willingness to
campaign independently to improve its members’ conditions. 
The testimony of prison custody officers (PCOs) provides vivid
‘bottom-up’ corroboration of management evidence, and contrasts
even more sharply with the ordered regime publicly portrayed by
PPS. Above all, the selected testimonies presented here provide
glimpses of the dreadful working conditions endured by officers. 
Unlike in the state sector, where new recruits undergo lengthy
probation, training and induction (see Justice 1 Committee, col.
), officers at Kilmarnock are deployed ‘on the front line’ almost
immediately after commencing employment: 
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it’s a six week training course which is mainly paperwork, and
you are given an afternoon of about one-and-a-half hours on
one wing basically shadowing an officer. That’s the only actu-
al on-the-job training you get … I was then posted to the
short-term houseblock which holds prisoners for up to four
years. The first day, they said, ‘Right, you are on Echo wing,
there you go’. I walked on — me and one other officer who
had been in the job three months — and ninety-two prison-
ers! I was like ‘What do I do here?’ And I said to the other guy
‘Look, so what do I do?’ He said ‘Oh, I cannae tell you — I’ve
got to go and escort some prisoners down to the med centre,
I’ll see you later’. And he went. So I walked onto the wing and
I am standing there with now about eighty prisoners because
he had taken twelve of them away. And they all came up, they
knew I was new, and they are straight away, ‘Aw, I’ve to get
this’, and ‘I want that’, ‘Open this door’. I hadn’t a clue
whether they are entitled to it or not. (Prison custody officer
 – hereafter PCO)
Officers’ work routines, the locking up and unlocking of
inmates, moving them to workshops, to the medical centre, to
reception and other escorting duties, were all disrupted by
understaffing. The following episode offers a rather extraordinary
take on the notion of the polyvalent worker:
Staffing levels were a problem right through the place. I was
an Intelligence Officer and was told by a supervisor, ‘I haven’t
got any staff today, can you work on visits?’ I said, ‘OK, fair
enough’. Due to monitoring telephone calls, I knew who was
bringing drugs in. I would wait at the entrance and make sure
they were searched. The sliders would be opened and prison-
ers would come in and I would be pulled away from search-
ing them to take them over to the visit hall. Then when I was
in the visit hall a supervisor would say, ‘Right, watch that
table now because I have to deal with something else’. When
I was monitoring a table another supervisor would say, ‘Can
you take such and such up to the houseblock because we have
got no staff ?’ I said ‘Well, I am actually working on the gate
right now’. He would say ‘We have no staff, just do as best you
can’. And when I was up in the houseblock — this is unbe-
lievable — the supervisor would say, ‘We have no staff in the
houseblock, can you take someone to health care?’ All this
time, the prisoners would be coming in the gate and not get-
ting searched. (PCO2)
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If daily pressures such as these contributed to high attrition,
then they were exacerbated by poor pay and conditions. PCO cited
the main causes of turnover as ‘the terrible, terrible wages’, the
‘terrible staffing levels’ and the ‘drastic’ shift patterns. Officers’
accounts of extended working time contradicted the version given
by Kilmarnock’s director to Justice 1. Officers reported working up
to thirty hours a week in excess of their contracted forty-four
hours, but they received no pay enhancement and were rarely able
to take the time-off-in-lieu accumulated. One recalled working
sixteen ‘ten-and-a-quarter-hour shifts on the trot’. Additional
(unpaid) work often had to be performed at the end of a shift. The
effects were most serious when officers were changing from a late
to an early shift: 
although you are paid until . [pm], you don’t get away until
maybe .. There are eight wings and you have to do a count
on all of them, and if there is one wrong you are held back.
Prisoners hide in the toilets, stuff up the covers to look as if
there are other prisoners, hide in each other’s cells. They do
this all the time because they know it screws the screws and we
don’t get paid. By the time I get home, it’s .. Takes you at
least an hour to wind down, so you are talking about .
before you are in bed sleeping. You have got to be back for .,
so you have to get up at .. Four hours’ kip, and then I’m back
in and dealing with ninety-two prisoners. (PCO)
Officers were rarely able to take the breaks that would provide
some relief from this relentless intensity. Staff meals were
supposed to be taken at the same time as those of the prisoners,
who were locked in their cells. But incessant demands from inmates
or inaccurate rolls gave officers little time to consume food. PCOs
also reported habitual breaches of SPS regulations in a catalogue
of informal and/or managerially-sanctioned customs and practices
that jeopardised the safety of staff and inmates alike. In
Houseblock 1, according to PCO3, prisoners were accustomed to
not being searched. 
When the doors opened, five guys from E-wing came towards
me. What you are supposed to do is to rub them down, give
them a wee search and make sure that they aren’t carting any-
thing they shouldn’t. So I am standing at the slider and the
prisoners are trying to get past me. I said, ‘Where are you
going, wait a minute and get searched’. ‘You don’t search us’.
I said, ‘Aye, I search everybody’. They said, ‘This isn’t
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Houseblock 2 you are working on now, this is the big boys’
houseblock. You don’t search long-term prisoners. If we are
getting searched then we’re not going to work’, and the other
officer standing next to me, who usually works on the wing,
said, ‘Right enough, we don’t bother searching these boys’.
According to PCOs, the failure to report or the downgrading of
incidents including assaults and discoveries of drugs, weapons or
other banned items, or the falsification of statistics in order to
prevent the prison from incurring fines, were systemic. Many
examples could be cited but the following incident is perhaps the
most shocking: 
this was when I finally said ‘I’m out of here’. A personal alarm
went off and I bolted up to it — it was at the long-term
houseblock, and it was an officer, XXX, who had had a pen
plunged into his neck … he was actually staggering down the
stairs, on his own, holding a bandage with blood pouring out
of it. I read a couple of weeks later that the assault was noth-
ing, he was barely scratched … they had definitely down-
graded that. How serious an assault can you get? (PCO1)
The neglect of regulations was seen by conscientious officers as
exacerbating the dangers of working at Kilmarnock:
I did my job by the book as best as I could, and I used to make
a lot of bother for myself. I used to get threatened daily, and
one supervisor, who had been in the SPS [Scottish Prison
Service], said, ‘You are the same as me, you do your job by the
book, and in the SPS nobody would think nothing, the pris-
oners would just go along with it. In here, the officers don’t do
it and the people that do it get a really hard time’. (PCO3)
As emphasised in the SPS mission statement, prisons exist not
only to deliver secure incarceration, but are also concerned with
rehabilitation, and the prison officer’s role is central to the
implementation of strategies aimed at challenging offending
behaviour. At Kilmarnock, staffing shortages and the lack of
resources undermined rehabilitation. 
You don’t have the resources, you don’t have the training to
do it either. I can speak for the short-term houseblock …
There was no rehabilitation programme at all. None. And
that’s where they need it most. The re-offence rate in the
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short-term wing is terrible. In and out, in and out, constant,
the same faces all the time. (PCO4)
For committed officers who joined the prison with the intention
of making a difference to prisoners’ lives, the perception that the
regime was failing to deliver meaningful programmes merely
added to their disillusionment. These officers could see little
alternative but to exit Kilmarnock. Crucially, they did not see the
PSU as being able to represent their interests, largely because it was
seen as being insufficiently independent of management or, in
PCO3’s words, ‘in Premier’s pocket’. 
This paper has illuminated the neglected realities of work and
employment in the privatised public service, albeit in the
distinctive world of the penal institution. While official sources
suggest, contra Gordon Brown, that the use of a private prison
contractor was at the expense of the ‘terms and conditions of
employees’, they understate the depth of the crisis at HMP
Kilmarnock. This is fully revealed only by evidence from prison
and corporate management, and by the testimony of prison
officers, which drill deep into Kilmarnock’s operations. These
sources prove that Premier deliberately misled the public over
staffing levels, attrition and working conditions. To have admitted
publicly to these problems would have attracted further
unwelcome critical scrutiny of Scotland’s only private prison at a
time when the connected interests of government (the Scottish
Executive), the prison service (SPS) and accountants (PWC) were
proposing a massive expansion.
Prison privatisation in Scotland (and its precedents in the USA
or the UK) should not be seen as involving the simple capture of
the state by private capital. Rather, they involve a complex and
dialectical interaction between political and economic agents who,
although sharing a common overall interest in prison privatisation
as part of the broader neoliberal, deregulatory and globalising
project, do exhibit differing dynamics within the process. More
generally, prison privatisation is inexplicable without reference to
the profound changes in penal policy as developed over decades.
Recent scholarship argues that penal policy is returning to a
Victorian punishment model in which the bureaucratic and
technical requirements of an institution overshadow the needs and
rights of prisoners (Pratt et al., ). Prisons in ‘advanced’ states
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are seeing the reappearance of long hours of lockdown, prisoner
segregation, and unproductive and psychologically destructive
regimes (Jewkes & Johnston, : ). An effective analysis of prison
privatisation dynamics must incorporate these broader dimensions.
That states have pursued market solutions to incarceration is only
partly attributable to the Wackenhuts, the CCAs and Securicors,
although due acknowledgment should be paid to their success in
lobbying government and influencing policy; and the fact that
states criminalise and incarcerate ever-increasing numbers of
people is rooted in broader questions of societal crisis and
criminology. Concretely, in Scotland the proposed extension of
privatisation was predicated on penal expansionist assumptions (see
Justice 1 Committee, col. ) that eschewed alternatives to
custody and innovation in rehabilitative justice. 
More specifically, regarding the relationship between state and
capital, shareholder pressure and the desire to maximise profit that
dominate corporate interests may be at variance with government
priorities. As observed, the stringency of contractual terms
negotiated by the Scottish Executive was perceived by Premier as
creating conditions that would damage profits because significant
breaches of key performance indicators were unavoidable.
Adapting Marx’s metaphor that competing capitalist firms
resemble warring brothers, we may liken the relationship between
government (the Executive and SPS) and Premier to that of
squabbling siblings. Spats periodically occur as contractors’
attempts to secure improved contractual terms are resisted by
government, whose actions are partly dictated by its own cost-
cutting imperatives.9 Yet there is an essential unity of purpose that
temporary and incidental differences do not threaten. Principally,
the state will not reduce the margins available to the extent that
they might act as disincentives to companies from participating in
the privatisation process, nor will companies wish to jeopardise
their relationship with the political institutions that are the source
of their contracts. For all that Premier complained to the SPS
about the severity of its contract terms, Kilmarnock Prison
Services Ltd (a PCG subsidiary) made a pre-tax profit of £.m for
the financial year ending  December , and PCG made a profit
of £.m for  (PPRI, nos. , ). Notwithstanding all the
caveats, it is the private firms with their substantial profits that have
been the principal beneficiaries of privatisation. 
The source of these profits, and of the cost minimisation that
underpins them, lies in the reduction in absolute numbers of staff
and the pursuit of the holy grail of labour ‘efficiencies’ and
‘flexibilities’. Essentially, the latter are rhetorical euphemisms used to
Inside the private prison
conceal the harsh imperatives of labour intensification, lean staffing
and inferior pay so vigorously pursued by the privatisers. For
whatever episodic differences arise between government and
contractor, they have an unshakeable united commitment to driving
down the cost of labour, with all the predictable consequences for
the immiseration of working conditions. 
Thus our findings resonate with the earlier privatisation
literature. Further, from the perspective of understanding
industrial relations at Kilmarnock — and more broadly, of
understanding them in the private prison sector — the role of the
PSU is pivotal. Despite some sabre-rattling when its standing
amongst its members was threatened, this anti-POA organisation
(likened by Black [] to the tame, employer-friendly ‘Spencer’
miners’ union established in the wake of the defeat of the British
General Strike of ) should be seen as an important bulwark for
the employers and state. Crucially, it prevented discontent from
hardening into grievance and then collective action (Kelly, 998).
Individual ‘exit’ became the only perceived response for staff
disillusioned with both employer and ‘union’. 
Inevitably, the question arises of the typicality of research
findings that are based on a single case study (Yin, ), and many
of the necessary caveats apply. It is not being argued here that the
extent of regime crisis and the appalling deterioration of
employee conditions apply to all private prisons in the UK.
Nevertheless, evidence from the USA and from other UK sources
suggests that these findings are by no means untypical. Since the
particular here is rooted in the wider political economy of
privatisation, employee experiences at Kilmarnock may be at the
extreme end of a spectrum. 
Of course, employee conditions may be mitigated by
management strategies, sectional union strength and the
contingency of sector (Arrowsmith, 2); but certain tendencies
towards the experience reported here may be applicable to a
greater or lesser extent to privatised or contracted-out workers.
Bach and Winchester’s (: ) account of the experience of the
public-service workforce after decades of neoliberal policy — one
of job loss, deteriorating employment conditions, demoralisation,
increased workloads, low pay and being undervalued — is
appropriate. However, the words of an assistant director of
Kilmarnock in appraising the experience of his prison may be even
more apposite as a metaphor for workers’ experience under
privatisation: ‘We have been flogging a tired and worn out horse for
far too long, such that the animal is not able to move any faster no
matter how hard we beat it’ (Lawrence McGhee,  March ). 
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‘privatisation theory’.
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complex: the emergence of prisons as sites of profit-generating
industry, with prisoners as hyper-exploited labour. These initiatives
were justified through the rhetoric of work as rehabilitation 
(Chang & Thompkins, ).
6 Chang and Thompkins () cite a private average annual turnover
rate of  per cent, as compared to  per cent in the public sector. 
7 The Scottish Prison Officers Association (SPOA), which had enjoyed
autonomy from the POA, merged with the POA and became the
Prison Officer Association Scotland (POAS).
8 Although running on a complement of  prisoners, Kilmarnock’s
contract stipulated that the prison could take up to . The  ‘extra’
prisoners allocated here were not matched by additional staffing. 
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Scottish government minister (at the minister’s request), the authors
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privatisation proposals. His answer was that it was the convergence
criteria of the Maastricht criteria and the government’s desire to get
the new prison expenditure ‘off the books’.
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